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I. INTRODUCTION: CLASSIFICATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court developed the three-tiered
framework of judicial scrutiny that now dominates equal protection
jurisprudence.' As this tripartite scheme evolved, its emphasis on group-based
classifications sparked impressive debates over which groups qualified as
"suspect classes,"2 but it also led many to overlook the role of government
1. According to this system, most government policies receive permissive, "rational basis"
scrutiny, while policies that classify on the basis of gender receive "intermediate scrutiny," and those
that classify based on race receive "strict scrutiny." See, e.g., Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 235 (1995) (applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications); FCC v. Beach Communications, 508
U.S. 307, 309 (1993) (applying rational basis review to commercial distinctions); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 199-204 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to gender-based classifications); see also
Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988) (extending intermediate scrutiny to classifications disfavoring
children born out of wedlock); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 474 (1971) (extending strict
scrutiny to classifications disfavoring aliens).
Despite the recent vintage of the tiered framework, see Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-204 (applying
intermediate scrutiny to gender-based classifications for the first time); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S.
184, 191-92 (1964) (applying strict scrutiny to racial classifications for the first time); cf Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (invoking the rhetoric of strict scrutiny while actually
applying very relaxed standards of scrutiny), it is now so well established that even the most powerful
critics of the conventional model concede its predominance. Compare Craig, 429 U.S. at 464 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (attacking tiered scrutiny in favor of a unified standard of equal protection), with Miller v.
Albright, 118 S. Ct. 1428, 1437 n.l 1(1998) (Stevens, J.) (applying tiered scrutiny), and Adarand, 515
U.S, 200, at 247 (Stevens, J., concurring) (admitting that tiered scrutiny accurately represents the state of
the law).
2. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-13 to 16-59 (2d ed. 1988); Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond
Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection
Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 147-70 (1976); Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Die, 106 YALE L.J.
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 108:439
interests This oversight is especially surprising because the class-based4
model itself depends on government interests:' In applying any level of
judicial scrutiny, courts must both define the government interests at stake and
weigh them on scales of constitutional "importance" and "relatedness."6
1123, 1155 (1997). A possible counterexample of this obsession with classification is the "fundamental
rights strand" of equal protection, under which the Warren Court construed equal protection to guarantee
certain individual rights. See generally GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 819-77 (12th ed.
1985) (using voting access, judicial procedures, and interstate migration as examples of this branch of
equal protection). These cases will not receive much attention here for two reasons. First, such cases
have become decreasingly significant as modem courts refuse to expand the scope of individual rights.
See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REv. 213, 285-
88 (1991). But cf Brad Snyder, Note, Disparate Impact on Death Row: M.L.B. and the Indigent's Right
to Counsel at Capital State Postconviction Proceedings, 107 YALE L.J. 2211, 2225 (1998) (arguing that
the fundamental rights strand should be reinvigorated). Second, since fundamental rights cases operate
within the three-tiered framework of scrutiny, they are analytically identical to classification-based cases
that require strict scrutiny.
3. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CAL. L. REv. 297,
318 (1997):
[T]he past few years have ... seen increasing, though still somewhat embryonic,
academic commentary on the nature of government interests and how courts should
analyze those interests.... Other than a single student note, [Stephen] Gottlieb's 1988
article appears to have been the first substantial examination of the theory underlying
governmental interests .... (footnote omitted).
See also John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J.
1205, 1248 (1970) ("Hopefully in time ... goal definition will come to be recognized as a crucial step in
the review of any choice, and a process of reasoning will be undertaken and exposed to view."); Stephen
E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional
Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REv. 917, 917-18 (1988) ("The validity of the process of inferring interests, the
validity of the interests inferred, and the validity of the use of governmental interests as a basis to
override constitutional rights have all been virtually ignored."); Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107
YALE L.J. 427, 428 (1997) (criticizing the current emphasis on choice among classification-based
standards of review); Symposium, Conference on Compelling Governmental Interests: The Mystery of
Constitutional Analysis, 55 ALB. L. Rtv. 535 (1992); Symposium, When Is a Line as Long as a Rock Is
Heavy?: Reconciling Public Values and Individual Rights in Constitutional Adjudication, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 707 (1994); cf Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 964-65 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[Given] the minimal
guidance in Adarand, the definition and application of the compelling interest inquiry seems to be
suspended somewhere in the interstices of constitutional interpretation.'); GUNTHER, supra note 2, at
600-877 (failing even to mention government interests in the course of an otherwise extensive
introduction to equal protection jurisprudence).
4. The word "class" will be used exclusively in the judicial sense of a category of persons, as in
a "suspect class," never in the of sense of socioeconomic demographic brackets.
5. The phrase "government interest" will be used consistently in order to avoid debates about
whether equal protection scrutiny applies to the effects of government policies, their intentions, or both.
The word "interest," as opposed to terms such as "motive, "purpose," or "objective," aptly refers both
to a subjective state of mind and to the object that inspires such a state. See WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 741 (1989). The muddiness between subjective
intentions and objective effects may be terminologically frustrating, but it accurately reflects the
Supreme Court's ambivalence on the issue. Compare Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,224-25 (1971)
(noting the myriad "hazards of declaring a lav unconstitutional because of the motivations of its
sponsors"), with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 232, 245 (1976) (holding that discriminatory purpose is
a necessary element of equal protection claims). See generally GUNTHER, supra note 2, at 704-10
(arguing that the "purposeful discrimination requirement" may be satisfied by proof of certain types of
objective effects).
6. Strict scrutiny, for example, requires an interest that is compelling (importance) and
narrowly tailored (relatedness). See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 235. Similarly, rational basis review
requires a legitimate interest that is rationally related to the challenged policy, and heightened scrutiny
requires an important interest that is substantially related to the policy. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,439-41 (1985).
Interest Definition
This Note will examine two judicial techniques that are used to define
government interests.7 The first technique is "generality manipulation," by
which judges adjust the generality with which interests are defined and
deliberately cause them to fail applicable tests of scrutiny. The second
involves "excluded-interest rules," which judges use to bar certain
government interests from judicial consideration altogether. Judge Sloviter has
observed that "how a question is framed [often] determines the answer that is
received."' Likewise, these techniques of interest definition determine
constitutional outcomes in individual cases, and they delimit the doctrinal
potential of equal protection as a whole.9
Part II will argue that generality manipulation has exposed three-tiered
judicial scrutiny to significant instability and abuse. Just as an individual right
can be described broadly or narrowly to provide broader or narrower
constitutional protection, a government interest also can be defined at various
levels of generality. Judges' choice among these levels of generality often
Conventional wisdom might suggest that interest analysis is only an exercise in post hoc
rationalization because courts decide cases solely on the type of classification at issue. See Gerald
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1, 8 (1972) (casting strict scrutiny as
uniformly "fatal" and minimal scrutiny as "virtually none in fact"). Such an argument would emphasize
that no Supreme Court majority has upheld a racial classification since World War II. Cf Korematsu,
323 U.S. at 223-24 (allowing internment of Japanese Americans); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81, 102 (1943) (approving a curfew imposed against Japanese Americans). But cf Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480, 491-92 (1980) (Burger, J., plurality) (upholding a racial affirmative action
program for federal contractors under strict scrutiny).
Recent Supreme Court precedent, however, belies the common assumption that classification is
the only important element of equal protection analysis. In Adarand Constructors v. Pena, for example,
the Court applied strict scrutiny to a racial affirmative action program. 515 U.S. at 235. Nevertheless, it
also remanded the case for further findings of fact regarding the government's interest at stake and
explicitly rejected characterizations of strict scrutiny as "fatal in fact." Id at 237-39; see also Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-32 (1996) (using rational basis scrutiny to strike down a state policy that did
not serve a legitimate government interest); cf Cass Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-
Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4, 77 (1996) (arguing that the Court's 1995
decisions mark an important shift in equal protection).
7. Some might suggest that judges do not define interests; litigants do. Such a view, however,
assumes an overly static view of doctrinal development. Lawyers make arguments that they expect
courts to accept, and courts have substantial control over these expectations through rulings and written
opinions. Also, judges decide constitutional law on the basis of their own view of the law, not on the
views of the parties. If litigants' briefs laid out all conceivable bases for decisions, the demand for
judicial law clerks would be significantly reduced.
A related proposal is that courts should read government interests directly from the government
itself-from the text of a statute, for example. Cf Gunther, supra note 6, at 44 (proposing that legislators
or government attorneys should be forced to articulate the government interest at stake). A "plain
language" approach to interests would, however, operationally subjugate constitutional protection to
legislative will. By misrepresenting the government interest at stake, for example, Congress could
arbitrarily cast a government interest as important or narrowly tailored enough to survive even strict
constitutional scrutiny. Gerald Gunther has argued that political accountability will guard against this
"creative drafting" problem. See id. at 47. In cases involving very popular statutes, however, the
majority is likely to support, rather than condemn, such political tactics.
8. Taxman v. Board of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1567 (3d Cir. 1996) (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
9. This Note will focus entirely on interest definition in equal protection jurisprudence. Since
parallel systems of tiered scrutiny have developed in free speech and substantive due process, however,
the analysis presented here is readily applicable to these other contexts as well. See Bhagwat, supra note
3, at 304-06.
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determines whether a particular interest satisfies the importance and
relatedness tests of judicial scrutiny. Thus, the power to manipulate interests'
generality implies corresponding discretion over whether government policies
will survive constitutional challenge.
To guide this powerful judicial discretion, Section II.C proposes a
"border points" theory of generality determination that is based on
relationships among generality, importance, and relatedness. The theory's
conceptual goal is to direct attention away from analytically irrelevant levels
of generality toward those that allow constitutional decisions to be logically
complete. In practice, this border points approach would allow three-tiered
scrutiny to be applied more honestly" and would clarify existing categories of
importance and relatedness."
Part III will present excluded-interest rules as vital, albeit unrecognized,
constitutional doctrines used to protect norms that conventional judicial
scrutiny cannot, such as "one person, one vote" and opposition to stereotypes.
Discussion will focus on two types of excluded-interest rules: "mandatory
interest rules" and "forbidden interest rules."
Mandatory interest rules exclude all government interests except one
from judicial consideration, constitutionally requiring a government policy to
serve the one "mandatory interest" that is not excluded. Their basic structure
allows mandatory interest rules to craft "pure" legal instruments that can
protect spheres of political impartiality. The clearest example of a mandatory
interest rule arises in voting apportionment. Courts currently require that
electoral districts be drawn to support fair representation; no other government
interest will suffice. This means that although ordinary political interests such
as increasing employment or environmental quality are adequate to justify
most government classifications, such interests are wholly inappropriate in the
context of electoral reapportionment. Because of the mandatory interest rule,
voting policies are constitutionally reserved for the service of democratic
impartiality, a value that cannot be alloyed without being lost.
Forbidden interest rules exclude government interests, such as racial
bigotry, that contradict constitutional norms of equal protection. There are
10. For an analysis of the practical desirability and dangerousness ofjudicial candor, see GUIDO
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 172-81 (1982).
11. Current application ofjudicial scrutiny has been widely criticized as doctrinally unstable and
analytically unsound. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
("How is this Court to divine what objectives are important?... [Such] phrases... are so diaphanous
and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of
legislation .... ); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 321 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting in part) (finding the conventional model to be "rudderless, affording no notice to interested
parties of the standards governing particular cases and giving no firm guidance to judges"); Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("IThe Court's decisions [aside from
those concerning race and national origin] can fairly be described as an endless tinkering with legislative
judgments, a series of conclusions unsupported by any central guiding principle."); see also Richard H.
Seeburger, The Muddle ofthe Middle Tier: The Coming Crisis in Equal Protection, 48 MO. L. REv. 587,
616 (1983) ("Unless some manageable equal protection test is devised, it seems likely that either equal
protection will cease being the chosen judicial tool for enforcing social justice or the Court
will... [suffer] loss of respect and institutional independence.").
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weaker and stronger forms of such rules. The weak form bars forbidden
interests but allows courts to evaluate any other, non-forbidden interests that
the policy might serve. The weak forbidden interest rule against gender-based
stereotypes, for example, has formally excised such stereotypes from equal
protection jurisprudence. However, policies can survive this rule if they
promote some other government interest that is not based on gendered
stereotypes. The stronger form of forbidden interest rules invalidates policies
that serve forbidden interests, regardless of other interests that the policy
might promote. For example, a policy might be unconstitutional per se if it
served an interest in denaturalizing racial minorities. Such an interest might be
so constitutionally unacceptable as to poison other, satisfactory interests that
the government policy also served.
Without providing a comprehensive theory of when excluded-interest
rules should be applied, Part III will illustrate doctrinal possibilities that such
rules allow. Mandatory interest rules permit judges to craft institutions, such
as in voting procedure, that embody and protect core political impartiality.
Forbidden interest rules allow judges to shape our constitutional culture by
marking certain government interests as irredeemably corrupt.
Part IV will consider the doctrinal interaction between the border points
theory and excluded-interest rules. Currently, judges uphold constitutional
values, even if they are not protected by class-based scrutiny, by manipulating
the generality of the interests at stake. Romer v. Evans'2 exemplifies this
tactic. If excluded-interest rules were thoughtfully applied in cases like
Romer, equal protection could protect various constitutional values in a stable
and intellectually honest way. Just as eliminating generality manipulation
should bring constitutional norms into the open, excluded-interest rules should
make generality manipulation doctrinally unnecessary.
II. MANIPULATING GENERALITY
One technique used in defining government interests is manipulation of
the generality at which they are described. Defining an interest more or less
generally affects its constitutional importance and relatedness; thus, judges'
power to choose among levels of generality entails substantial control over
whether an interest can satisfy judicial scrutiny. This Part will propose a
model to limit arbitrariness and abuse in determining government interests'
generality, in the hope of clarifying tiered judicial scrutiny.
12. 517U.S.620(1996).
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A. Basic Concepts
Issues concerning generality are omnipresent in legal interpretation, 3
and recent scholarship in the context of substantive due process' 4 should
provide a useful introduction for generality in equal protection.
To understand what it means for a right to be more or less "general,"
imagine a series of concentric circles. 5 Each circle represents one possible
basis for vindicating individual rights in a substantive due process suit.
Different diameters represent different levels of generality at which the right
might be articulated; the center represents the narrowest conceivable right, one
that would only protect the plaintiff's own actions. Wider circles, representing
more general rights, would not only protect the plaintiffs conduct but would
also shield a range of related activities.'6
The Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,7 for example, could
have articulated its holding using any of several different levels of generality.
The Court could have established a narrow right to buy contraceptive foam, a
broad right to plenary sexual freedom, or a right of intermediate generality."
Despite its conceptual importance, generality was never explicitly mentioned
in Griswold, nor in any other due process landmark, because discussion of
generality alone could not answer the operational question of how broadly to
define Ms. Estelle Griswold's rights. The interpretive tools that might
otherwise have specified "proper" levels of generality for due process rights
(tradition, original intent, and political theory, for example), proved to be far
13. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565 (1995) (noting that describing an
activity as commercial or noncommercial depends entirely on the generality with which the activity is
defined); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414-16 (1922) (finding an unconstitutional
taking under the so-called "diminution-in-value" test by defining the estate's total value at a narrow
level of generality); CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 14 (recognizing generality as a basic analytical engine
for common law and constitutional adjudication); Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The
Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1091-92 (198 1)
("[A]ll adjudication requires making choices among the levels of generality on which to articulate
principles, and all such choices are inherently non-neutral.").
14. See Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights,
57 U. CHi. L. REv. 1057, 1065 (1990) (calling characterizations of generality the "principal weapons" in
interpretive battles surrounding individual rights); see also David L. Faigman, Measuring
Constitutionality Transactionally, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 753, 778 (1994) ("[T]he interpretive debate
concerning the level of abstractness at which [a] right is conceptualized.., is endemic throughout
constitutional adjudication.").
15. I am grateful to Matthew Vaxman for this metaphor.
16. See Chart 1; see also Tribe & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1058.
17. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a statute that prohibited the use of birth control based on a
substantive due process right of privacy).
18. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1058. The Court's choice among these levels of
generality in Griswold critically influenced subsequent rulings concerning the limits of individual
privacy. The most general articulation of these rights, for example, would have constitutionally
invalidated anti-sodomy laws, while the least general articulation of such rights would not. As a matter
of positive law, the Court in Bowers v. Hardwick interpreted Griswold's privacy right at an intermediate
level of generality, proclaiming a right "to decide whether or not to beget or bear a child" and upholding
Georgia's sodomy statute. 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986); see also Tribe & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1066.
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more controversial than helpful. 9 Thus, although generality is now a familiar
part of due process scholarship," its recognition has not significantly affected
the adjudication of constitutional cases.
CHART 1. POSSIBLE LEVELS OF GENERALITY
FOR THE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS IN GRISWOLD




Right to Autonomous Right to Plenary
Self-Determination Sexual Freedom
On the other hand, generality is hardly ever discussed in the context of
government interests.2 Applying the metaphor of concentric circles, broader
circles would represent more general interests-that is, interests that could
conceivably support a range of related policies aside from the one under
challenge.' And the narrowest conceivable interest, enacting the policy for its
own sake, would lie at the center. '
19. Compare Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1988), andROBERT H. BORK,
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 150 (1990), with LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING
THE CONSTITUTION 79-80 (1991), and Tribe & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1058-59, and Gene R- Nichols,
Jr., Bork's Dilemma, 76 VA. L. REv. 337, 344-45 (1990) (book review). Even Tribe and Dorf's model,
which draws rights' generality from the "essential facts" of judicial precedents, does not claim to
provide an objectively correct level of generality; it only claims to be honest in admitting its substantive
content and assumptions. See Tribe & Dorf, supra note 14, at 1105.
20. See, e.g., William K. Kelley, Inculcating Constitutional Values, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY
161, 180 (1998) (reviewing GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (13th
ed. 1997) and GEOFFERY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 1996)) (noting that issues
surrounding generality have become a canonical element of substantive due process education); Cass R.
Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship Between Due Process
and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1173-74 (1988) (discussing the malleability of
generality in due process jurisprudence); Tribe & Dorf, supra note 14,passim.
21. The only work to address generality's influence on equal protection is Robert C. Farrell's
article, Legislative Purpose and Equal Protection's Rationality Review, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1, 15-16
(1992). Farrell recognized generality as a highly manipulable concept in equal protection jurisprudence,
but he did not consider whether such manipulation could be contained.
22. The parallel between individual rights and government interests is one of analogy, not of
identity. In the discussion of due process rights, for example, the center point was defined as protecting
the plaintiff's own conduct; thus, each circle represented a favorable outcome for the plaintiff. See supra
note 14. In the context of government interests, on the other hand, the center point represents an interest
in enacting the policy for its own sake; thus, each circle does not necessarily represent a favorable
outcome for either party. While the similarities between due process and equal protection may usefully
illuminate discussions of government interests, an exploration of relevant distinctions between equal
protection and due process lies far beyond the scope of this Note.
23. See Chart 2. As Judge Easterbrook has astutely recognized, words such as "generality" and
"abstraction" are themselves generalized abstractions. Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority,
59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 353 (1992). Different speakers use them in different ways, and each is
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United States v. Virginia,4 which struck down the Virginia Military
Institute's (VMI) all-male admissions policy, demonstrates how generality can
be applied to government interest analysis. The government interest in
Virginia could have been described in at least three different ways. In order of
increasing generality, women could have been excluded from VMI (i) for no
reason other than a bare desire to exclude them; (ii) in order to train VMI
cadets as citizen-soldiers;25 or (iii) in order to produce an educated citizenry in
Virginia.2 6
CHART 2. POSSIBLE LEVELS OF GENERALITY
FOR THE GOVERNMENT INTERESTS IN VIRGINIA
Interest in Excluding Women Interest in Preserving
for the Sake of Doing So the Adversative Method
Interest in Training
*Citizen-Soldiers
Interest in Promoting Interest in Providing
the General Welfare Collegiate Education
Each of these interests could be evaluated using the conventional
importance and relatedness tests of judicial scrutiny. The narrowest interest,
excluding women from VMI just for the sake of doing so, would be absolutely
contingent upon the use to which the terms would be put. Compare id. (using generality to express
greater or lesser dependence on the facts of a legal dispute), with Bruce Ackerman, Liberating
Abstraction, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 317, 346-48 (1992) (using generality to express greater or lesser
connection with constitutional grants of power).
This Note uses the term "generality" deliberately to suit its application to equal protection
analysis: An interest's generality describes its analytical distance from the narrow interest in enacting a
policy for its own sake. This definition is logically parallel to defining an individual right's generality as
its distance from the right protecting only the litigating plaintiff's actions. See supra note 16.
24. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
25. See id at 545.
26. See id. at 576 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Two complications deserve mention. First,
these three interests do not constitute a list of all conceivable levels of generality. Second, there are
many different "types" of generality that can be measured along many different axes. See Tribe & Dorf,
supra note 14, at 1067-68. For example, an interest in "educating the citizenry of Virginia" is more
general than an interest in "educating Virginia's citizenry in the field of Mathematics" and is also more
general than an interest in "educating the citizenry of Richmond." But this interest in "educating the
citizenry of Virginia" is more general than each of the other two in different ways. Thus, it is difficult to
determine whether teaching everyone mathematics is more or less general than teaching all subjects to a
smaller group.
These different "types" of generality could ultimately be integrated with the present analysis by
adding more dimensions to the model-one for scope of subject matter and another for scope of
citizenry, for example. The technical methods of this integration, which would include aggregating
interests' constitutional importance and relatedness across each of these dimensions, are too complex for
current expository purposes. Cf id. at 1067-70 (acknowledging multiple dimensions of abstraction in
descriptions of due process rights' generality).
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related to the challenged policy because the policy and interest are logically
inseparable. Such a narrow interest would also be absolutely unimportant from
a constitutional viewpoint, since it provides no justification except a
restatement of the classification itself, resembling a childish "just because"
more than a viable legal argument."
The two more general interest definitions-training cadets and educating
Virginians-are of greater importance than the narrowest interest definition
because they appeal to broader social values. However, these two interests are
also less related to VMIl's admissions policy because they could also be served
by policies that do not discriminate on the basis of gender. The relationship
between interests' generality and their constitutional force may be
summarized as follows: First, as interests are defined more narrowly, they
become less important. Second, as interests are defined more generally, they
become less related to the government policy at issue.
B. Judicial Discretion
Courts possess enormous discretion over how broadly or narrowly
government interests are defined. The existence of such discretion may be
inevitable, but its application should be analyzed and contained. In the
absence of any theoretical guide, judges have used their control over
generality to strike down government policies that they just as easily could
have upheld. This practice has taken two contrasting forms.
1. Narrowing Interests
By defining a governmental interest narrowly, courts can prevent it from
satisfying the importance prong of judicial scrutiny. Although this narrowing
tactic has been used sparingly, Romer v. Evans2" is an important example of its
application.29 Romer concerned a Colorado constitutional amendment (the
"Amendment") that prevented state agents from protecting gays from
discrimination. The Supreme Court struck down the Amendment as a
classification of persons undertaken for its own sake" and, therefore,
described the government's narrow interest as mere "animus."'" Such an
27. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (requiring some "independent and
legitimate legislative end" aside from the classification itself); cf. infra note 31 (arguing that the Romer
Court branded the lack of such interests as unconstitutional "animus").
28. 517 U.S. at 620.
29. For an older pair of cases that use this "narrowing" technique, see City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985); and United States Department of Agriculture v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528 (1973).
30. Romer, 517 U.S. at 635.
31. Id. at 632. Many might sensibly object that the term "animus" signifies much more than
simply the absence of a legitimate, rationally related government interest. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar,
Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REv. 203 (describing Romer as involving
a status-based bill of attainder); Andrew Koppelman, Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS J. 89, 89-94 (1998) (arguing that the Amendment presumptively embodied
unconstitutional animosity against homosexuals); cf WEBSTER'S ENCYCLOPEDIC UNABRIDGED
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interest is certainly not important enough to satisfy rational basis review, 32 but
the Court did not have to define Colorado's interest so narrowly.
From one perspective, Colorado actually might have limited
homosexuals' access to antidiscrimination suits for the pleasure of doing so-
from mere "animus," to use the Romer Court's term-but such a narrow
interpretation of the interest at stake ignores the Amendment's broader
purposes and effects. Viewed at a more general level, the State's interest
might have been to contain the social and economic costs of litigating such
suits.3 3 Viewed still more generally, the Amendment might have been part of a
profound "Kulturkampf," a vigorous cultural struggle between basic moral
values and disruptive sexual deviance.34
At present, no vocabulary exists to discuss which, if any, of these
descriptions is correct.3 The danger of Romer's argument, however, is that it
could invalidate any policy of which the Court disapproved.36 Why did
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 5, at 54 (defining animus as "hostile feeling or
attitude").
The Romer Court, however, used either a very strange meaning of the term "animus"
or a grossly inadequate means of proving it. The Court's only justification for applying the deprecatory
term "animus" was the absence of a satisfactory government interest: "[The Amendment's] sheer
breadth is so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by
anything but animus toward the class that it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state
interests." Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 (emphasis added); see also Joseph S. Jackson, Persons of Equal
Worth: Romer v. Evans and the Politics of Equal Protection, 45 UCLA L. REv. 453, 495 ("[T]he Court
seems to treat the absence of a rational basis for Amendment 2, and the existence of animus toward gays
and lesbians, as two sides of the same coin."); cf Barbara J. Flagg, "Animus" and Moral Disapproval: A
Comment on Romer v. Evans, 82 MINN. L. REv. 833, 851 (1998) ("If it is a 'conventional and venerable'
proposition that animosity is not a legitimate state interest, it is not at all equally clear precisely how the
Romer majority came to identify that 'purpose' as the impetus behind Amendment 2.); Koppelman,
supra note 31, at 135-3 6 (noting the sparse indicia of actual discriminatory animus); Robert F. Nagel,
Playing Defense, 6 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS J. 167, 171-72 (1998) (same). In another section, the
Court repeats the language of animus: "[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference
that the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected." Id at 634.
Later in the same paragraph, however, the Court concludes that this purported animosity is
unconstitutional because it violates the "conventional and venerable" principle that "a law must bear a
.rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose...I." ld at 635 (citation omitted). Thus, as
the Court used the term in Romer, "animus" seems simply to mean a government interest in imposing a
class-based burden for the mere sake of doing so.
32. See Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446-47 ("[S]ome objectives-such as 'a bare.., desire to harm a
politically unpopular group,'-are not legitimate state interests." (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534)
(citation omitted)). Indeed, if such a government interest were allowed to satisfy rational review, then no
policy could ever fail to do so; nonsuspect classifications would literally be self-justifying. Cf Cass R.
Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689, 1710 (1984) (arguing that
equal protection may be understood as a "basic prohibition of naked preferences" for all legislative
classifications).
33. The petitioners seriously erred by not proposing this government interest to the Court
directly. Instead, the State implausibly argued that it was trying to conserve resources currently spent on
homosexuals' antidiscrimination suits in order to defend racial minorities' rights more aggressively. See
Petitioner's Brief at *41, No. 94-1039, 1995 WL 310026, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
34. Romer, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35. The basis for such a vocabulary will be explored infra Section II.C.
36. A related but separate problem surrounds a court's ability to manipulate generality in order
to upholdpolicies that should properly be held unconstitutional. If a court can inflate. a particular
interest's importance by defining it broadly, that court may rely upon the exaggerated urgency and
magnitude of the interest to finesse or overlook questions of constitutional relatedness. Indeed, this is the
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Colorado pass its Amendment? To hurt homosexuals. Why did VI exclude
women? To hurt women. Why did Congress cut federal welfare benefits? To
hurt poor people. The argument's easy pattern reveals its doctrinal weakness.
Resort to animus is always sufficient to explain a government classification,
but it is never necessary. Broader, more important interests are always
available if courts are willing to seek them.37
2. Broadening Interests
Romer marks one end of the spectrum of generality manipulation,
defining the interest so narrowly that it fails the importance prong of judicial
scrutiny. At the other end, courts can define government interests so broadly
that they fail the relatedness prong. In United States v. Virginia," for example,
the Court described Virginia's government interest as educating "citizen
soldiers.., imbued with love of learning, confident in the functions and
attitudes of leadership.., and ready.., to defend their country in time of
national peril."39 Justice Ginsburg held that the broad government interest in
"creating citizen-soldiers" was important enough to satisfy intermediate
scrutiny, but she found that this interest was inadequately related to the
challenged admissions policy: "Surely that goal is great enough to
accommodate women.... [Thus, it] is not substantially advanced by [their]
categorical exclusion."4 By describing Virginia's goal in such illustrious
terms, the Court implicitly ensured that it would not be "substantially related"
to the admissions policy and thus that the interest would not satisfy
intermediate scrutiny.
lesson of Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944). It should be obvious that the language of strict scrutiny-without constraining judicial
discretion over generality-is no solution at all if exceedingly important interests are permitted to elude
standards of relatedness. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632 ("The search for the link between classification and
objective gives substance to the Equal Protection Clause; ... it marks the limits of our ofn authority.").
The popular phrase, "[t]he Constitution... is not a suicide pact," Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963), has been interpreted as meaning that ordinary restraints like relatedness might
no longer apply to policies undertaken in pursuit of certain vital governmental interests such as national
survival. If one accepts any category of governmental interests as being above constitutional judgment,
see generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, Introduction: Overriding Public Values, in PUBLIC VALUES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1-7 (Stephen E. Gottlieb ed., 1993) (affirming the historical basis for accepting
constitutionally overpowering necessity), then rationalizing generality becomes even more important. In
times of social stress, even comparatively small issues can be interpreted as issues of raw survival. If this
manipulation of generality exaggerates the importance of such interests and allows them to transcend
constitutional constraints of tailoring, then strict scrutiny will be futile.
37. Every policy can be justified by at least one interest other than animus because every policy
can be analytically broken into at least two parts: whom it affects and what it does. The first of these is
animus, but the second is not. A tax on luxury cars, for example, both burdens owners of such cars
(animus) and increases tax revenues (not animus). An ordinance barring white people from public parks
both burdens white people (animus) and reduces park populations (not animus). Cf Note, Legislative
Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 128 n.34, 129 (1972) (arguing that at
least one legislative purpose can always be defined that is rationally related to a policy under challenge).
38. 518U.S. 515 (1996).
39. Id at 545 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
40. Id at 545-46.
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Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion stridently criticized the majority's
definition of the supporting government interest, arguing that Justice Ginsburg
had interpreted that interest too broadly:
What the Court describes as 'VMI's mission' is no less the mission
of all Virginia colleges.... To be sure, those general educational
values are described in a particularly martial fashion in VMI's
mission statement, in accordance with the military, adversative,
and all-male character of the institution. But imparting those
values in that fashion-i.e., in a military, adversative, all-male
environment-is the distinctive mission of VII.
41
This last, limiting phrase is crucial. Having conceded that a general
interest in creating citizen-soldiers was not sufficiently related to VMI's
admissions policy, Justice Scalia challenged the Court to consider a narrower,
more closely related interest: creating citizen-soldiers in a military,
adversative, all-male environment.
Virginia illustrates the operational power of generality manipulation in
interest definition, even as it reveals the technique's theoretical obscurity.
Justices Ginsburg and Scalia used different levels of generality to define
Virginia's government interest, and these different generalities were pivotal in
justifying the Justices' divergent conclusions. Nevertheless, no member of the
Court (and no academic commentator) recognized generality as the analytical
core of the dispute. Thus, although Justices Ginsburg and Scalia deftly framed
the government interest to support their respective positions, neither could
explain why one interpretation of the government's interest should be legally
preferred to another.
A second example of this broadening form of generality manipulation is
Judge Wiener's concurrence in Hopwood v. Texas.42 Hopwood invalidated a
race-conscious admissions policy at the University of Texas Law School ("the
Law School") that had favored Mexican American and African American
applicants.43 Judge Wiener defined the Law School's government interest
broadly, as a "broad[] array of qualifications and characteristics of which
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though important element."'  Judge
Wiener termed this interest "student body diversity."4
By defining the Law School's interest so broadly, Judge Wiener
guaranteed that the interest would not be related enough to satisfy strict
41. Id. at 587 (emphasis added).
42. 78 F.3d 932, 962-68 (5th Cir. 1996) (Wiener, J., concurring).
43. See id. at 962.
44. Id. at 965 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
45. Judge Wiener borrowed much of his terminology and analysis from Justice Powell's dicta in
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Cf id
(acknowledging that a broad definition of diversity would be a compelling interest but striking down the
challenged affirmative action policy on relatedness grounds); Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 965-66 (same).




scrutiny. Judge Wiener noted that the Law School's policy neither increased
the student body's nonracial diversity nor encouraged the inclusion of other
racial groups such as Native Americans or Asian Americans. 4 6 These
conclusions are indisputably correct, as far as they go. The Law School's
policy did not serve any all-inclusive notion of diversity, nor was it ever
intended to do so. The hidden and technically unanswered question concerned
whether the policy had to satisfy such broad visions of diversity in order to
satisfy strict scrutiny.
A dissent in Hopwood, had there been one, might have defined the Law
School's interest more narrowly, thereby diminishing its importance but
increasing its level of relatedness. The Law School's policy obviously did not
increase nonracial diversity, and it equally obviously did not include all racial
minorities. The government interest needed to be defined more modestly. For
example, the policy could conceivably have supported a government interest
in preventing African Americans and Mexican Americans from being
excluded from the first-year class, an interest in sustaining African American
and Mexican American communities within the Law School, or an interest in
producing African American and Mexican American lawyers to populate the
ranks of the next generation of judges, business executives, and politicians in
Texas. There is no guarantee that any of these interests would have satisfied
the importance prong of strict scrutiny, but at least such interests would have
better answered Judge Wiener's objections concerning relatedness.47
Just as a court can narrow any policy's interest until it fails for
importance,48 it can also broaden any interest until it fails for relatedness.49
Under the current legal regime, there is no guide for deciding which levels of
generality should be considered.
46. See id. at 966.
47. Other possibilities include racial inclusion for African Americans and Mexican Americans in
the upper echelons of Texas's bar; preventing such groups from feeling marginalized and alienated at the
Law School; and counteracting present racism against such groups in the Texan professional
community. Each of these interests is of questionable importance and relatedness, and each might well
fail the hefty requirements of strict scrutiny. The important point is that Judge Wiener's analysis of his
concept of "diversity" by no means exhausted the range of government interests that might have
sustained the policy.
48. See supra text accompanying notes 29-37.
49. Cf Robert F. Nagel, "Unfocused" Governmental Interests, in PUBLIC VALUES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 36, at 45, 55-57 (demonstrating that any governmental interest can be
abstracted at the interpreter's discretion to the point of becoming "unfocused"). For a concrete example
of this phenomenon, consider Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997), in
which Senior Judge Kane asserted that he would never find a race-conscious policy constitutional.
"Contrary to the Court's pronouncement that strict scrutiny is not 'fatal in fact,' I find it difficult to
envisage a race-based classification that is narrowly tailored. By its very nature, such program is both
underinclusive and overinclusive." Id. at 1580. This last sentence either admits Senior Judge Kane's
willful determination to manipulate any government interest until it is found unsatisfactory, or it implies
that Senior Judge Kane has in mind a short list of all conceivable interests that affirmative action could
possibly serve. This second interpretation, that only a limited range of interests may be considered in
affirmative action cases, will be criticized below. See infra Subsection III.A.3 (discussing mandatory
interest rules).
1998]
The Yale Law Journal
C. A Theory of Generality
1. Background Precepts
Before proposing a model for determining interests' generality, I should
briefly revisit the character of generality itself. This Subsection will use basic
mathematical graphs to make previous arguments more rigorous and
transparent. Since mathematics is exceedingly rare in equal protection theory,
a word of warning seems appropriate: The following illustrations are intended
neither to quantify equal protection jurisprudence nor (far worse) to reduce
complex judgments to rigid formulae. Their goal is only to capture elementary
aspects of generality analysis in a logically precise form.
For example, in discussions of substantive due process rights, broader
rights were shown to produce constitutional protection for a wider range of
individual activities." Thus, in the context of Griswold's privacy rights, a
declared right of sexual self-determination would be more general and more
protective than the narrowest right, a right to buy contraceptives. This
principle can be expressed in a graph that plots every possible level of
generality against the scope of that level's constitutional protection."
CHART 3. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION AS A










In contrast, government interests' constitutional stature may be
subdivided into two components: importance and relatedness. As discussed
previously, an interest's importance increases as it is defined more generally,52
50. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16 (describing this relationship metaphorically using
concentric circles).
51. See Chart 3. This graph makes two assumptions. First, it places all levels of generality on a
straight line with a slope of one. Second, the graph assumes that levels of generality are continuous, such
that a creative thinker faced with any two levels of generality could theoretically always conceive of an
intermediate right between them. These assumptions can be relaxed without consequence provided only
that the line (or the disconnected series of dots) continues to slope upward: CP = f(G) I 5CP/SG > 0.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 29-37.
[Vol. 108:439
Interest Definition
and the narrowest conceivable interest, a policy enacted for its own sake, is of
no constitutional importance at all. 3 These two principles may be illustrated
by a graph of importance as a function of generality. Using Virginia as a
concrete example, an interest in excluding women for the sake of doing so
would be insufficiently important for any tier of scrutiny; thus, it would have
an importance level and a generality level of zero. A more general interest in
producing citizen soldiers would satisfy the importance prong of intermediate
scrutiny; and an extremely general interest in providing education for
Virginia's citizenry might even qualify as compelling. 4





a IntermediateScrutiny Interest in Training
cCitizen-soldiers
Interest in Excluding
o Women from VMI
0 Generality
On the other hand, an interest's relatedness decreases as the interest's
generality increases, and the narrowest interest-enacting a policy for its own
sake-is absolutely related to the government policy.5 A graph of relatedness
as a function of generality crisply illustrates these two ideas. Returning to
Virginia, VMI's interest in excluding women is infinitely tailored to its
discriminatory admissions policy, and this interest is of zero generality. 6 The
more general interest in producing citizen-soldiers was not substantially
related to the admissions policy under Justice Ginsburg's interpretation of
intermediate scrutiny,57 and a more general "duty to educate" would be even
more tenuously related.
53. See supra text accompanying note 31.
54. See Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 971 F. Supp. 1316, 1327-30 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(finding a state interest in operating a laboratory school for educational research to be compelling).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
56. (RG) = (Max.,0).
57. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 546 (1996).
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The above discussion reveals the vital difference between the effect of
generality on equal protection interest definition and its effect on due process
rights definition. Substantive due process rights turn on only one question:
whether they are "fundamental."58 The relationship between generality and
constitutionality is, therefore, logically simple. The more generally a right is
construed, the more broadly fImdamental social values inhere, and the more
activities receive constitutional protection. For equal protection, however,
governmental interests are defined by two variables: importance and
relatedness. Since generality affects each of these components in opposite
ways, generality's effect on interests' constitutional power is fundamentally
complex. As an interest is defined more generally, it becomes more important,
but it also becomes less related. As the following section will demonstrate,
this bidirectional effect allows an interpretive solution to generality problems
in the context of government interest analysis that could never occur in the
context of substantive due process.
2. Applying Generality to Equal Protection
As a technical matter, equal protection cases must be decided by
determining whether any interest exists, at any level of generality, that
satisfies applicable standards of importance and relatedness.59 Finding one
58. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
59. See FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) ("Where there are
'plausible reasons' for Congress' action, 'our inquiry is at an end."' (citation omitted)). This simple
principle highlights another difference between generality in equal protection and generality in due
process. In discussing substantive due process, it would be senseless to ask if some level of generality
exists at which Griswold's right to privacy would constitutionally invalidate sodomy regulations. Of
course there is. Although the Supreme Court declined to adopt such a broad interpretation of the right to
privacy in Bowers v. Hardivick, 478 U.S. 186, 189 (1986), the Court could conceivably have announced




interest or a series of interests that fails to satisfy these standards of scrutiny
is, therefore, a logically inadequate basis for striking down a policy because
proof that some interests fail cannot determine whether another interest might
not succeed. Nonetheless, almost every judicial invalidation has rested upon
exactly this type of negative proof.6"
The theoretical challenge is to explain how a court possibly can strike
down a policy when there are far too many levels of generality to evaluate
individually.6' Without testing every conceivable interest for importance and
relatedness, how can a judge know if a government interest exists that satisfies
judicial scrutiny? Fortunately, based on the principles of generality advanced
above,62 only two levels of generality need to be examined: GenBI and Gen 2.63
GenB1 is the level of generality that describes the most important government
interest that still satisfies the relatedness prong of judicial scrutiny.
Conversely, GenB2 is the most closely related interest that still satisfies the
importance prong ofjudicial scrutiny.
Because the relationship between generality and constitutionality in due process is unidirectional,
there is no countervailing limit to check the effect of any hypothesized interpretive principle. To
interpret rights "as broadly as possible" would paralyze governmental policy making; every government
act would violate the extended fringe of some individual right. On the other hand, to interpret rights "as
narrowly as possible" would define rights out of existence entirely. Cf Tribe & Dorf, supra note 14, at
1098 (criticizing Justice Scalia's effort to define constitutional "traditions" as narrowly as possible
because consistently doing so would eliminate individual rights altogether).
Not so in equal protection. Because generality both increases interests' importance and decreases
their relatedness, and because constitutionality depends on both of these factors simultaneously,
increasing an interest's generality will only increase its constitutional force up to a certain point. The
interplay of these two criteria is what makes a heuristic of "trying" to find a constitutionally satisfactory
interest possible.
60. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 534-46 (basing an invalidation on having
found two government interests that failed to satisfy applicable standards ofjudicial scrutiny); Romer v.
Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (same); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556, 1579-84
(D. Colo. 1997) (basing an invalidation on having found one government interest that failed to satisfy
applicable standards of judicial scrutiny).
61. Cf supra note 51 (arguing that levels of generality are continuous and infinite).
62. See supra text accompanying note 27.
63. See Chart 6.
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CHART 6. IMPORTANCE AND RELATEDNESS

































Gen,: Interest in excluding women for the sake of doing so.
Gen,: Interest in training citizen-soldiers.
Gen2: Interest in providing collegiate education.
GenB: The most important government interest that fulfills intermediate
scrutiny's standard for relatedness.
GenB2: The most related government interest that fulfills intermediate
scrutiny's standard for importance.
If the border points do not satisfy intermediate scrutiny, then Line A
represents the range of interests supporting VMI's admission policy. If
the border points do satisfy intermediate scrutiny, then Line B more
accurately describes the government interests at stake.
These "border points"--so named because they rest on the border
between adjoining categories of importance and relatedness-are theoretically
essential to equal protection decisionmaking because only these points can
conclusively determine whether any interest satisfies both prongs of judicial
scrutiny. If either border point satisfies the two constitutional standards, then
judicial scrutiny is satisfied by that border point itself. On the other hand, if
either one of these border points does not satisfy both prongs of judicial
scrutiny, then no level of generality can do so."'
64. The following proof shows that if Gen,1 fails to satisfy judicial scrutiny, no other
government interest can succeed in doing so:
GenB1, by definition, lies at the very edge of failing to satisfy the relatedness prong of scrutiny.
Since relatedness decreases as generality increases, any interest that is more general than Gen,, will also
be less related and fall below the requisite level of relatedness. If GenB1 fails to satisfy judicial scrutiny,
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Without considering the applicable border points, a decision to strike
down a government policy could always be arbitrary. As we have seen, a court
can always narrow the interest to the point at which it fails for importance, or
it can broaden the interest to the point of inadequate relatedness. Since levels
of generality can always be found at which an interest fails to satisfy
constitutional scrutiny, no number of failing interests can justify holding a
policy unconstitutional.65 Only by testing a border point can courts
satisfactorily determine whether all levels of generality fail judicial scrutiny,
and only this type of strong demonstration can logically justify invalidating a
challenged government policy.
Although the border points approach may seem difficult as a matter of
theory, it could be practically implemented through one operational principle:
If a court finds a government interest that satisfies only one prong of judicial
scrutiny, it should seek an interest of higher or lower generality in an effort to
satisfy the other prong as well. This process should be repeated until either a
satisfactory interest or a constitutional border point is found. For example, if
the court found an interest that satisfied the relatedness prong, but lacked
importance, it should continue to search for a more general interest either until
discovering some interest that satisfied both prongs of scrutiny or until
encountering an unsatisfactory GenB. If, on the other hand, the court found an
interest that satisfied the importance prong, but lacked relatedness, it should
search for a less general interest until discovering an interest that satisfied
both prongs or until it demonstrated that GenB2 failed to do so.
In Virginia, for example, the Court considered an interest in "creating
citizen-soldiers" that was sufficiently important but insufficiently related.
According to the border points theory, the Court should have proceeded to
evaluate narrower, more related interests. For example, the Court could have
considered interests in avoiding costs of additional physical facilities, in
creating male citizen-soldiers, in preserving an organic barracks experience, in
retaining one-tiered physical training regimens, 66 or in providing single-sex
education to VMI cadets.67 Without determining whether such interests would
it must fail the importance prong. Since importance decreases as generality decreases, any interest that is
less general than GenB, will also be less important than Gen,,. If Gen., is not sufficiently important, then
every interest that is less general than Gen,, will be inadequately important as well. A parallel proof can
be constructed by substituting Gen 2 for Gen,, and by switching "relatedness" for "importance." These
two proofs, taken together, show that if either Gen., or Gen, 2 fails judicial scrutiny, then no conceivable
level of generality will pass.
65. See supra Section II.B.
66. See United States v. Virginia, 976 F.2d 890, 896 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Based on evidence about
the experience of the service academies and the Marine Corps, the district court was justified in finding
that if women were to be admitted, VMI would have to convert to a dual-track physical training program
in order to subject women to a program equal in effect to that of men, and that, as found by a study
conducted at west Point, cadets of both sexes would nevertheless perceive the treatment of them as
unequal, leading to jealousy and resentment."), affd, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
67. The state alleged a broader interest in "diversity" for all citizens, which the Court dismissed
as inconsistent with the history of Virginia's educational development. Id. at 898-99. Possible
justifications for excluding this interest from consideration will be taken up infra Subsection III.B.1.
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have been important enough to satisfy intermediate scrutiny, 8 the crucial
point here is that only by testing these narrower, more closely related interests
could the Court have ensured that its decision was not based upon mere
manipulation of generality. 9
3. Practical Consequences for Doctrinal Development
Adopting a border points theory of generality would yield two doctrinal
benefits. First, it would impart direction to a completely rudderless area of
equal protection decisionmaking. At present, there is neither guidance for nor
discussion among courts concerning generality in interest definition.70
Recognizing the importance of constitutional border points may steer legal
debates away from analytically irrelevant interests-that is, interests that are
drawn too broadly or narrowly-toward those that can answer the pivotal
doctrinal question: whether any supporting interest can satisfy judicial
scrutiny.
The second benefit addresses an obvious objection to the border points
method itself. Skeptical readers might ask how anyone can determine which
levels of generality are border points and which are not. Although this
question is an important one, the practical difficulty of locating border points
only illustrates how hazy the existing categories of importance and relatedness
are. This categorical haziness is not a flaw in the border points theory; it is
another dimension of the doctrinal problem that the theory is designed to
solve. The lines that currently divide legitimate, important, and compelling
interests are extremely unclear.7' One reason for this confusion may be the
heretofore universal inattention to interest analysis. 72 Another reason,
however, is that courts currently can decide cases by distorting generality, thus
failing to explain the vital terms of their decision. If a court decides to
invalidate a government policy, for example, it can decide not to evaluate one
level of generality, X, which might be only barely inadequate under
68. If any of these government interests is not important enough for intermediate scrutiny, then
GenB (which lies on the border between the categories of acceptable and unacceptable importance) must
lie between this newly discovered, inadequately important interest and the original interest in "creating
citizen-soldiers."
69. The argument is not that Virginia was wrongly decided, but rather that the Court's analysis
does not adequately support its holding. Despite this Note's repeated use of Virginia, that case is only
one representative example. Just as generality manipulation can occur in any equal protection case at any
tier ofjudicial scrutiny, the border points method applies to all types of equal protection cases as well.
70. Cf Steve Sheppard, The State Interest in the Good Citizen: Constitutional Balance Between
the Citizen and the Perfectionist State, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 994 (1994) ("[The nature ... of the
process of defining an interest... [is] relatively unknown. Significantly, the lower courts are thus left
with little guidance, and the system as a whole is insufficiently predictable.... Without a more
comprehensive approach to the analysis of interests, the irrational, attitudinal, or ad hoe approach must
govern, leaving an appearance of both unpredictability and illegitimacy.").
71. Nor are the distinctions between interests that are rationally related, substantially related, or
narrowly tailored substantially clearer. See sources cited supra note 11.
72. See sources cited supra note 3.
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appropriate scrutiny, and might instead attack level Y, which might be far
more (or less) general and therefore much more obviously inadequate.
The cost of this evasiveness is that courts fail to draw doctrinal lines that
are necessary to give the tripartite framework substantive content. By
condemning only interests that are obviously unimportant or that are clearly
unrelated, courts gloss over important constitutional questions such as: which
kind of government interests are legitimate, which are compelling, and how
intimate is a substantial relationship. For anyone who is troubled by the
rampant indeterminacy in these doctrinal categories,73 a principled approach to
generality is at least a partial solution. The border points method is difficult
because, in the process of identifying border points, it would require courts to
find (or to create) coherent constitutional borders. More importantly, from a
pragmatic point of view, the border points approach would achieve these goals
in a typically judicial way: allowing constitutional principles to emerge
incrementally and accretively.74 Every policy that a court struck down would
require identification of some GenBI or GenB2 and would mark one more
concrete point along the border between two categories of constitutional
importance or relatedness. Over time, the accumulation of equal protection
precedents should trace coherent, principled categories. If they do, the
tripartite framework will be vindicated as based upon solid, workable legal
categories.75
III. EXCLUDED-INTEREST RULES
Even as attention to interest definition sharpens analytic distinctions
within the class-based model of judicial scrutiny, it also provides an
opportunity to examine the conventional model's normative limitations. This
Part will look beyond classification-based equal protection to identify two
ways that government interests are excluded from judicial scrutiny altogether.
First, courts require that certain types of policies serve one government
interest to the exclusion of all others. These requirements will be called
"mandatory interest rules." Second, courts flatly bar some government
73. See sources cited supra note I1; cf Hans A. Linde, Who Must Know What, When, and How:
The Systemic Incoherence of "Interest" Scrutiny, in PUBLIC VALUES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra
note 36, at 219, 231 ("Upon examination, this two-dimensional model [of importance and relatedness]
proves about as accurate as a flat-earth road map-good enough for highway driving but no practical use
to miners, navigators, mountain hikers, or oil drillers, nor to lawmakers and state courts.").
74. For a structural description of the gradualist mechanics of judicial lawmaking, see
CALABRESI, supra note 10, at 96-101. For a discussion of the economic costs and benefits of this
process, see Sunstein, supra note 6.
75. This Part has been deliberately portrayed as a constructive project, trying to perfect or
modify a framework of class-based scrutiny that is presumed to be fundamentally sound. However, if the
border points approach fails to reveal identifiable borders between categories of importance and
relatedness, the current frame of judicial scrutiny will be exposed as practically unworkable and of
questionable moral weight. This deconstructive possibility should not be dismissed out of hand, but the
border points method should serve either to close important gaps in conventional jurisprudence-if such
gaps can indeed be closed-or to undermine tattered doctrines of judicial scrutiny in favor of equal
protection doctrines that transcend group-based classification altogether.
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interests from judicial consideration as constitutionally unacceptable,
regardless of their importance or relatedness.76 These bars will be called
"forbidden interest rules." In the course of describing how excluded-interest
rules operate outside of class-based equal protection, this Part will sketch
tentative principles describing when and how they should be applied.
A. Mandatory Interest Rules
This Section will use Guf, Colorado & Santa Fj Railway Co. v. Ellis"
to introduce the basic structure of mandatory interest rules. These rules shelter
institutions such as voting apportionment and jury selection that protect
democratic impartiality from the influence of ordinary political interests.
Finally, discussion of City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.7" will demonstrate
the potential harms of applying mandatory interest rules too broadly.
1. Inglorious Beginnings
Mandatory interest rules first arose under a legal theory that is now
thoroughly outdated. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries,
different "types" of government actions derived their legitimacy from distinct
"sources" of governmental power.79 Thus, in equal protection, it seemed quite
natural that different types of policies (debt law, corporate law, tort law, etc.)
could only be justified by government interests that matched the policies'
legal character."0
In Ellis, for example, the Court struck down a statute that awarded
attorneys' fees to tort claimants who had prevailed against railroad companies.
The dissent argued that this fee-shifting statute served a legitimate interest in
deterring railroad defendants from pursuing aggressive, dilatory litigation
76. Forbidden interest rules must be firmly distinguished from decisions that simply hold certain
interests, like "animus," insufficiently important to satisfy traditional levels of scrutiny. See supra text
accompanying notes 29-37 (explaining "animus" cases). Determining importance is a standard part of
traditional equal protection doctrine. Forbidden interest rules, on the other hand, function wholly outside
of this standard model.
77. 165 U.S. 150 (1897).
78. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
79. See Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in
Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 713 & n.3 (1994) ("In this era,... courts [first] defined the
boundaries between distinct spheres of authority by articulating the appropriate principles that could
legitimate state action in each sphere.... [and then] evaluated the specific governmental action in
question by focusing on the principles that justified it.").
80. The Court's designation of particular government interests as "proper" captures this
historical connection between policies' perceived character and their supporting government interests.
Cf Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 566-67 (1931) ("In determining what [legislative classifications are]
arbitrary, regard must be had to the particular subject of the state's action .... [T]he regulation as to the
giving of a bond or insurance policy.., in order to be sustained, must.., relate to the public safety.");
F.S. Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920) (invalidating a taxation policy that was unrelated
to the degree of government protection provided because "the ground of difference upon which the
discrimination is rested has no fair or substantial relation to the proper object sought to be accomplished
by the legislation"). For a contrary argument that the limitations on government interests in Smith and
F.S. Guano were simply arbitrary, see Note, supra note 37, at 133-36.
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strategies."' The majority rejected this argument out of hand, without
disputing the proposed interest's empirical premise, its importance, or its
relatedness. Instead, the fee-shifting policy was curtly branded as "arbitrary"
discrimination against railroads.8 2
A careful reading of Ellis uncovers three legal moves. First, the Court
held that tort judgments were ordinary debt obligations and that the fee-
shifting provision was only their enforcement mechanism.83 Second, the Court
applied its mandatory interest rule. The Court held that, since the fee-shifting
provision fell within an implicit category of "debt law," the policy must be
justified by only one government interest: upholding legal duties to pay. 4
Third, since railroads had the same obligation to pay debts as any other entity,
no legitimate grounds was found for singling them out for particular legal
burdens.
The particular rule in Ellis, which rested on a constitutional distinction
between interests that may support "debt policies" and those that may support
"tort policies," does not comport with modem constitutional deference to
economic regulation. 6 However, the methodology of mandatory interest rules
has continued to play an influential role in equal protection jurisprudence to
this day.
2. Mandatory Interest Rules and Political Impartiality
a. Voting Apportionment
The most widely accepted use of mandatory interest rules involves
voting apportionment. The leading case, Reynolds v. Sims, 7 struck down
electoral policies that had skewed legislative representation in favor of rural
voters. The Reynolds Court held that any apportionment policy would violate
equal protection "unless relevant to the permissible purposes of legislative
apportionment." 8 The Court further defined "achieving... fair and effective
81. See Ellis, 165 U.S. at 166-67 (Gray, J., dissenting).
82. See id at 157-59.
83. See id at 158-59.
84. See id. at 157 ("[B]efore a distinction can be made between debtors, and one be punished for
a failure to pay his debts, while another is permitted to become in like manner delinquent without any
punishment, there must be some difference in the obligation to pay. ... " (emphasis added)).
85. See id at 157-59.
86. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Communications, 508 U.S. 307, 309 (1993); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
87. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Mandatory interests were first recognized in a 1972 student note by
Robert Nagel. See Note, supra note 37, at 152. Since his work was concerned exclusively with the
relatedness prong of rational review, the doctrinal function of mandatory interest rules was not
considered.
An interesting sidelight concerning Reynolds is that it was decided in the same year as McLaughlin
v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964), the first case to apply strict scrutiny to racial classifications.
But cf Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (invoking the rhetoric of strict scrutiny
while actually applying very relaxed standards of scrutiny). Thus, mandatory interest rules arguably have
a precedential pedigree almost as venerable as the classificatory model itself.
88. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 565.
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representation for all citizens... [as] the basic aim of legislative
apportionment... ."'9 By prescribing fair and effective representation as the
only interest that voting policies could constitutionally serve, the Court
erected a constitutional barrier preventing all other interests, no matter how
compelling or narrowly tailored, from even being considered.9"
The Court fashioned the mandatory interest rule in Reynolds because
traditional scrutiny, even at its most demanding, is ill-equipped to protect
political impartiality. Conventional tests of importance and relatedness are
designed safeguards against governmental arbitrariness; thus, they only
require that government policies serve a public goal of specified importance
with a certain degree of effectiveness. In electoral apportionment, however,
the preeminent hazard is not governmental caprice; it is political bias.
Mandatory interest rules are structurally necessary in cases where invaluable
impartiality might otherwise be sacrificed to government interests that are
sufficiently important and related to satisfy the applicable level of scrutiny.
For example, consider a gerrymander that diluted rural voters' electoral
power in order to fund urban development projects. No matter how vital such
urban projects were and no matter how indispensable the gerrymander were to
their success, such a policy would unconstitutionally interfere with "normal"
voting patterns in pursuit of ordinary, political ends.9' By Reynolds's
constitutional lights, population-proportionate voting was held to be a
peculiarly delicate political treasure, the very foundation of democratic
legitimacy.92 Tinkering with voting districts for any end other than fair voting
89. Id. at 565-66 (emphasis added).
90. Whatever the means of accomplishment, the overriding objective must be
substantial equality of population among the various districts, so that the vote
of any citizen is approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in
the State. [N]either history... nor economic or other sorts of group interests,
are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities from population-
based representation.
Id. at 579-80 (emphasis added); cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966)
("IT]he interest of the State, when it comes to voting, is limited to the power to fix qualifications."
(emphasis added)). The opinion listed a few interests that might justify deviation from population-
proportionate voting, see Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 578, 580 (allowing consideration of districts'
compactness and of political subdivisions), but since these interests were explicitly justified as
preempting or containing abusive gerrymanders, they are not contrary to a mandatory interest rule
regarding fair representation.
91. The actual impartiality of geographical, population-proportionate voting systems is not
essential to the present argument. Although the democratic myth surrounding geographic districting is a
powerful one, see, e.g., Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 379 (1963) ("Once the geographical unit... is
designated, all ... are to have an equal vote-whatever their race, whatever their sex, whatever their
occupation, whatever their income, and wherever their home may be in that geographical unit. This is
required by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."), recent scholarship has
mounted a powerful challenge to such systems as deeply biased, see LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF
THE MAJORITY 71-156 (1994) (identifying racial partiality implicit in geographic voting districts). If our
national mythology supporting geographic voting districts were abandoned, then the terms of Reynolds's
mandatory interest rule would have to change. The limited point here is simply that if the Reynolds
mandatory interest rule is justifiable, it must be justified by an appeal to political impartiality.
92. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 564 n.41 ("Free and honest elections are the very
foundation of our republican form of government."' (quoting MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 288
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itself would pollute this presumed purity and would violate equal protection
by fundamentally undercutting representative politics.
b. Judicial Procedure
Another area in which the Supreme Court has recently considered
mandatory interest rules is judicial procedure. Two important cases in this area
are Heller v. Doe,93 which rejected a mandatory interest rule concerning
evidentiary burdens of proof, and J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. TB.,94 which
proclaimed such a rule concerning jury selection.
Heller upheld a statute that established lower burdens of proof for
commitment proceedings involving mentally retarded persons than for
proceedings involving mentally ill persons. The Court held that mentally ill
persons were more frequently subject to misdiagnosis; thus, the higher
burdens of proof were justified by an interest in lowering the risk that they
would suffer erroneous curtailments of liberty.95
Although the state's interest in avoiding false commitments satisfied
ordinary rational basis review,96 Justice Souter and three other dissenting
Justices argued for a mandatory interest rule. They contended that since
burdens of proof typically balance liberty deprivations against public security,
disparate burdens of proof must correspond to the relative weight of
individual liberty or public goods at stake. 97 Since involuntary commitment is
an equally significant liberty deprivation for mentally ill persons as it is for
mentally retarded persons, the dissenters concluded that no government
interest could justify the disparate burdens of proof. The majority's purported
interest in avoiding erroneous diagnosis, even if true, lent "not a shred of
rational support to the decision to discriminate against the retarded in
allocating the risk of erroneous commitment."9'
The Heller majority rejected mandatory interest rules as applied to
burdens of proof, but importantly, it did not criticize such rules' basic
constitutional logic. In fact, only one year later, six Justices announced a
mandatory interest rule in J.E.B. The J.E.B. Court invalidated sex-based
peremptory strikes in jury selection, holding that "the only question is whether
[this] discrimination on the basis of gender... substantially furthers the
State's legitimate interest in achieving a fair and impartial trial.... [T]he only
legitimate interest [the respondent] could possibly have in the exercise of its
peremptory challenges is securing a fair and impartial jury."99
(1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting))); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (proclaiming the right
to vote to be "preservative of all rights").
93. 509 U.S. 312 (1993).
94. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
95. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 321-24.
96. See id. at 322-28.
97. See id at 339 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[B]urdens of proof are assigned... not to reflect the
mere difficulty of avoiding error, but the importance of avoiding it ... " (emphasis added)).
98. Id at 341 (Souter, J. dissenting).
99. Id. at 136-37 & n.8 (emphases added).
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c. Democratic Impartiality
Although courts have never explained why mandatory interest rules are
appropriate in some circumstances and not in others, a tentative theory may be
drawn from this brief discussion of Reynolds, J.E.B., and Heller. First, the
conclusive difference between Reynolds and Ellis is the character of the
political space that their mandatory interest rules are designed to preserve.
Debt law is one of many multifunctional policy instruments, and its value is
not significantly undercut by being harnessed to one government interest
rather than another. Voting, on the other hand, is different. Impartial, fair
voting is a fundamental social value that would be destroyed if it were
tempered with any goal other than impartiality itself. Traditional scrutiny
would be inadequate protection for such impartiality because even a
compelling political interest would destroy voting's fundamentally apolitical
detachment. Thus, the mandatory interest rule fits perfectly.
Similarly, consider the peremptory strikes in J.E.B. Jury selection
procedures presumptively occupy and produce a zone of legitimating
neutrality in the courtroom,' just as fair voting practices legitimate acts by
elected branches. Imagine litigants that used race-based peremptory strikes to
ease social tensions surrounding racially charged lawsuits or sex crime
prosecutors who used gender-based strikes to boost their odds of obtaining
convictions. These government interests might very well suffice for ordinary
types of policies, but usingjury selection to achieve them would compromise
the integrity of the judicial process as a whole.
In contrast, the burdens of proof at issue in Heller could serve one goal
just as easily as another, without affecting the trial's impartiality in any way.
One may approve or disapprove of Kentucky's decision to favor mentally ill
persons, but no additional wrong follows from expressing such favor using
evidentiary standards rather than another legal instrument. Thus, the majority
was correct to reject Justice Souter's arguments from history.
Electoral apportionment and jury selection are believed to stand in a
sacred public space, the value of which is defined by its detachment from
political interests. By ensuring that such policies are supported only by
reference to interests in fairness and impartiality, mandatory interest rules
defend the fundamental character of the neutral public space itself. Having
considered several cases in which courts properly applied mandatory interest
rules, I now turn to one in which they did not.
100. Again, the veracity of this image of judicial integrity is not essential to my argument. A
colorblind judicial system might embody preexisting racial bias, cf. GUINIER, supra note 91 (arguing that
similar bias exists in geography-based voting systems), and peremptory strikes might be unhelpful
instruments for ensuring impartiality in any case, see, e.g., Morris B. Hoffman, Peremptory Challenges
Should Be Abolished: A Trial Judge's Perspective, 64 U. CHi. L. REv. 809 (1997). Nevertheless, the
mandatory interest rule employed in J.E.B. both assumes and requires the importance of peremptory
strikes in maintaining juries' impartiality.
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3. Affirmative Action and Doctrinal Abuse
In 1995, a Supreme Court majority applied strict scrutiny to an
affirmative action program for the first time."' Seven circuit courts, however,
have gone even farther and have applied a mandatory interest rule: racial
classifications may only serve to remedy past discrimination committed by the
defending government unit.'0 2 Since these circuit courts relied heavily upon
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., I
will call this mandatory interest rule "the Croson rule."' 3
To understand the significance of Croson's mandatory interest rule, it
must be sharply contrasted with ordinary strict scrutiny. If racial
classifications are inherently invidious, conventional strict scrutiny would
justify a court's demanding compelling, narrowly tailored justifications for
their use. 4 The Croson mandatory rule, however, amounts to "strict scrutiny
plus": First, a court must use strict scrutiny to eliminate all government
interests that are not compelling or not narrowly tailored. Second, from any
remaining interests, the court must eliminate all government interests except
the mandatory interest in remedying the acting government agent's past
discrimination. Hopwood v. Texas is a famous illustration of the Croson rule
in practice.'0 5 The plaintiffs in Hopwood argued that the Law School's
affirmative action policy served a compelling government interest in
101. See Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,227 (1995).
102. See Monterey Mechanical Co. v. Wilson, 125 F.3d 702, 714 (9th Cir. 1997), reh'g denied,
138 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1998); Police Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 100 F.3d 1159, 1167-68 (5th Cir.
1996); Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586, 596 (3d Cir. 1996); Aiken v. City of
Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1162-63 (6th Cir. 1994); In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination
Employment Litig., 20 F.3d 1525, 1544 (11th Cir. 1994); O'Donnell Construction Co. v. District of
Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Milwaukee County Pavers Ass'n v. Fiedler, 922 F.2d
419, 421-22 (7th Cir. 1991). But see Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting a
mandatory interest rule in a case involving a race-conscious hiring decision).
103. See 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (plurality opinion) ("[Tihe Wygant plurality indicated that the
Equal Protection Clause required 'some showing of prior discrimination by the government unit
involved.'" (quoting \Vygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986))); id, at 493 ("Unless
[classifications based on race] are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote
notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."); id. at 492 ("[If the city could
show that it had essentially become a 'passive participant' in a system of racial exclusion.... [it] could
take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system." (citation omitted)); see also Monterey, 125 F.3d at
713 ("For a racial classification to survive, ... it must be a narrowly tailored remedy for past
discrimination, active or passive, by the governmental entity making the classification." (citation
omitted)). The Fifth Circuit has provided the clearest statement of this mandatory interest rule and its
perceived basis in Supreme Court precedent:
To the extent that the court found that racial preferences are constitutional in the absence
of remedial action to counteract past provable discrimination, it erred. The Supreme
Court has "insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by the governmental unit
involved before allowing limited use of racial classifications in order to remedy such
discrimination.'
Messer v. Meno, 130 F.3d 130, 136 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
267,274 (1986)).
104. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989); cf. Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 228 (holding that strict scrutiny is a necessary and sufficient guard against potential malice hidden
within "benign" racial classification).
105. 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
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remedying past discrimination committed by the state's entire educational
system, from its elementary schools to its public universities." 6 The court
dismissed this interest without reference to conventional categories of
importance and relatedness. Instead, the court invoked Croson's mandatory
interest rule: "In order for [state officials] to direct a racial preference program
at the law school, it must be because of past wrongs at that school."' 7
The analytical problem with Croson's mandatory interest rule is that it
cannot be justified by the arguments that were used to support other instances
of such rules. 08 In Reynolds and J.E.B., mandatory interest rules were
employed to protect politically sacred zones of neutrality that voting and jury
selection are presumed to occupy. In marked contrast, American race relations
stand thoroughly corrupted." 9 "Societal discrimination," as it is called, is
commonly dismissed as "too amorphous a basis for imposing a racially
classified remedy,""0. but it is more accurate to say that such discrimination is
too pervasive a basis for imposing such remedies." In the words of Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, any court to address societal discrimination
"could uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and
timeless in their ability to affect the future.""' 2 Without considering the merits
106. See id. at 950-52.
107. Id. at 952 (emphasis added).
108. Defenders of the Croson rule might argue that the mandatory interest rule is justifiable,
independent of the "impartiality" rationale advanced in other cases. Evaluation of such justifications
would be premature, however, since they have not yet been advanced.
Moreover, it should be clear that the blunt arguments against racial discrimination that could
support Adarand are insufficient to support Croson. For example, if government-imposed racial
classification is so invidious as to be per se unconstitutional, then no exception should be made for
remedying past discrimination. Cf infra Section III.B (analyzing strong interest rules, which could
implement such a categorical ban). Although remedying past discrimination is the only interest that the
Supreme Court has credited as a compelling government interest thus far, see Croson, 488 U.S. at 493,
there is no reason to think that it is the only compelling interest that could be legally conceived. As the
Seventh Circuit explained:
A judge would be unreasonable to conclude that no other consideration except a history
of discrimination could ever warrant a [racially] discriminatory measure unless every
other consideration had been presented to and rejected by him.... It is not as if the
rectification of past discrimination had a logical or equitable priority over other legitimate
goals that discrimination might serve.
Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 1996). Perhaps it seems commonsensical only to allow
racial discrimination as a remedy for past racial discrimination, but such common sense is not
constitutional doctrine. Furthermore, even meeting commonsense constitutionalism on its own terms,
racial classifications certainly should not be limited only to remedying past government discrimination;
it should also be available to stop present government discrimination and to preemptfuture government
discrimination.
109. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 273-74 & nn.3-5 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the
continuing effects of racial discrimination); Croson, 488 U.S. at 494 ("Our continued adherence to the
standard of [strict scrutiny] ... does not, as Justice Marshall's dissent suggests .... indicate that we view
'racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of the past' . (citation omitted)); Wygant, 476 U.S.
at 276.
110. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 220 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276).
111. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 ("No one doubts that there has been serious racial
discrimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal remedies ... societal
discrimination is... over expansive.").
112. Id; see also Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 932 (.'"IT]he case against race-based preferences does not
rest on the sterile assumption that American society is untouched or unaffected by the tragic oppression
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of denying such remedies, the existence of such deep-rooted, widespread bias
at least proves that impartiality cannot justify the Croson rule; there is simply
no racial impartiality for such a rule to preserve.
The costs of misapplying a mandatory interest rule are especially high in
contexts where such rules operate above and beyond the strictures of strict
scrutiny, such as affirmative action. This increased social cost arises because
the Croson rule would have no operational impact at all in an affirmative
action case in which the government's interests were not compelling and
narrowly tailored; strict scrutiny alone would invalidate the policy, regardless
of the mandatory interest rule. Therefore, even if "racial discriminations are in
most circumstances irrelevant,""' 3 the Croson rule would only have
independent effect in cases where racial classifications do serve some
compelling, narrowly tailored interest.
To envision such scenarios more concretely, imagine a series of
educational, penological, or law enforcement programs that could not survive
without race-conscious selection or promotion policies."' Imagine further that
one such policy (or, indeed, all such policies taken as a set) were conclusively
proven necessary and sufficient to eradicate the effect and practice of racial
discrimination in America. Under the mandatory interest rule, even mountains
of evidence supporting this "Super Policy" would not lend it one shred of
constitutional support, unless the particular government agents implementing
the policy could argue (falsely) that they were only trying to remedy their own
institutional history of discrimination.'
Although an interest in remedying the defendant-government's own
discrimination could plausibly support a racial classification under the Croson
rule,"' an interest in remedying all discrimination could not. This arbitrary
technique of interest exclusion represents a destructive abuse of mandatory
interest rules' that has emerged from peculiarly troubling historical
of its past. Rather, it is the very enormity of that tragedy that lends resolve to the desire to never repeat
it."' (quoting Maryland Troopers Ass'n v. Evans, 993 F.2d 1072, 1079 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal citation
omitted))). A critic of the Hopwood opinion might note that legally barring societal discrimination as a
state interest manifests a desire never constitutionally to confront the tragic oppression of our past, while
making its repetition more, not less, likely.
113. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 214 (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
114. Cf Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 601-02 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring) (comparing
the interest in broadcast diversity to that of an integrated police force, a public school faculty, or a
professional school student body); Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a race-
based promotion scheme for officers working in correctional boot camps as narrowly tailored to the
compelling state interest in criminal rehabilitation and control); Hunter v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
971 F. Supp. 1316 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (upholding an educational experiment that used racial standards in
creating a sample student population that approximated the ethnic diversity of urban schools); Adarand
Constructors v. Pena, 965 F. Supp. 1556 (D. Colo. 1997) (finding a compelling state interest in
remedying, through contracting set-asides, public and private discriminatory barriers that minority
groups and women face in the highway and mass transit industries).
115. Cf Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 339 (1993) (invoking similar rhetoric in deciding whether
disparate burdens of proof could be used in involuntary commitment proceedings for mentally ill and
mentally retarded persons); supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
116. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 469.
117. Judge Posner criticized Hopwood and Croson insofar as they seemed to assign a "logical or
equitable priority" to rectifying past discrimination as compared to other goals that affirmative action
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circumstances"' and that continues to exert profound influence over the logic
and practice of affirmative action litigation."9
might serve, concluding that "there is a reason that dicta are dicta and not holdings, that is, are not
authoritative." Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 919.
118. Strict scrutiny is often lauded as the necessary brake against "invidious racial
discrimination." See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-95. Throughout the civil
rights era, strict scrutiny was not only necessary, it was also sufficient protection against racial
discrimination. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (using strict scrutiny to strike down an
anti-miscegenation law); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (striking down prohibition on
interracial cohabitation); see also Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam) (invalidating
racial segregation in prisons). Only when affirmative action plans began to discriminate against whites,
however, did the Court introduce a "strict scrutiny plus" mandatory interest rule. No court adopting the
Croson standard has yet explained why a standard of review that was adequate to vindicate African
American civil rights in the 1960s required an "extra" safeguard to deal with racial discrimination
against whites in the 1990s.
119. The extent of this influence is most apparent from the viewpoint of government defendants.
Under the Croson rule, only an interest in remedying the classifying agent's past discrimination will
even be considered as a constitutional justification for a racial classification. Thus, whatever the actual
effects of an affirmative action policy may be, viable legal defenses only arise from the acting agent's
own history. The courtroom debate will hinge on whether the defendant can confess and demonstrate its
own acts of discrimination that are sufficiently significant and sufficiently recent to justify a
"temporary" racial remedy. As America's most flagrant examples of government discrimination fade
from popular memory, defendants that rely on such history-based justifications should become
decreasingly likely to prevail.
Without the Croson rule, however, the government may defend its affirmative action policies by
reference to public benefits, not historical wrongs. Any compelling interest could begin the court's
discussion, whether it were remedying past discrimination, eliminating racial subordination, providing
prison control, preventing illiteracy, or delivering effective health services. Subsequent legal arguments
would then center upon whether the challenged racial classification was truly necessary to attaining the
proposed interest or whether there were a less restrictive means of serving the compelling government
interest at stake.
From a social point of view, this second legal dynamic is far more productive because it would
focus debate upon the social interests that particular racial classifications were designed to serve. On the
one hand, abolishing the Croson rule would allow defendants to prevail where the government's racial
classification is truly indispensable to serving an urgent social need. On the other hand, plaintiffs under
such a regime could strike down affirmative action policies only by suggesting some less restrictive
means of achieving the underlying interest that the racial classification was designed to promote. The
constitutional process of litigation and advocacy is thus transformed from one dominated by blame-
oriented history to one focused on practical policy solutions.
Ideally, the Court would simply overrule Croson, thereby creating a national rule. Since civil
rights advocates seem justifiably anxious about litigating before the present Court, however, this
possibility seems remote. Cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, Supreme Court Avoidance; On Piscataway, Strategy
and the High Court, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 1997, at A2 (discussing how the conservatism of the current
Justices toward race has led litigants to settlement). On the other hand, circuit courts could
independently use Adarand-which did not adopt Croson's mandatory interest rule-as an opportunity
to reexamine their previous commitment to Croson. Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit,
appears to have undertaken precisely this type of reexamination. Compare Milwaukee County Pavers
Ass'n v. Fielder, 922 F.2d 419, 421-22 (7th Cir. 1991) (employing the Croson rule to strike down
minority business initiatives), with Wittmer, 87 F.3d 916, 919 (dismissing Croson and Milwaukee
County Pavers Ass 'n as nonbinding dicta).
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B. Forbidden Interests20
Whereas mandatory interest rules are primarily justified by the sanctified
political institutions that they protect, the forbidden interest rules' legitimacy
stems from the corrupt political forces that they reject. When the Court has
confronted government interests that are constitutionally unacceptable, yet
would be inadequately proscribed by ordinary judicial scrutiny, it has used
forbidden interest rules to excise these offensive interests from judicial
consideration altogether. Two versions of these rules deserve attention: a
"weak" version and a "strong" one.
1. Weak Forbidden Interest Rules
Weak forbidden interest rules bar particular interests from being
evaluated but leave all non-forbidden interests intact. Thus, even a policy that
served many forbidden interests might still survive constitutional challenge if
any one of its supporting interests were not forbidden. The Court recently
applied a weak forbidden interest rule in United States v. Virginia,2' where
VVII claimed an interest in saving its adversative method from disruptive
coeducational integration.' Justice Ginsburg dismissed this interest by
constructing an analogy to arguments that had been used some decades before
to oppose women's admission to law schools, medical schools, and military
academies."2 She then concluded that interests based on gendered stereotypes
should not even be subjected to traditional scrutiny.124 In dismissing VMI's
120. As a preliminary matter, forbidden interests must not be confused with interests that are
simply not important enough to satisfy standard judicial scrutiny. See supra text accompanying notes 29-
37 (discussing so-called "animus" cases). Forbidden interest rules bar particular interests because they
contravene a substantive principle of equal protection, regardless of whether they are otherwise
"important."
121. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
122. See id. at 540-41.
123. See id. at 542-45.
124. See id. at 541-42 ("State actors controlling gates to opportunity... may not exclude
qualified individuals based on 'fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and
females.' . . . [They] may not rely on 'overbroad' generalizations to make 'judgments about people that
are likely to... perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination."' (quoting Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 139 n.11 (1994))). In
framing her argument, Justice Ginsburg identified and assembled a substantial line of precedent to
support her forbidden interest rule. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 139 n.11 ("Even if a measure of truth can be
found in some of the gender stereotypes.... gender classifications that rest on impermissible stereotypes
violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical support can be conjured up for the
generalization."); Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 725 ("[I]f the statutory objective is to
exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent
handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate."); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
201 (1976) (holding that gendered disparity in drunk driving "is not trivial in a statistical sense, [but] it
hardly can form the basis for employment of a gender line as a classifying device."); Weinberger v.
Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975) ("[T]he Constitution forbids... gender-based differentiation
premised upon assumptions as to dependency...."); id at 645 ("Obviously, the notion that men are
more likely than women to be the primary supporters of their spouses and children is not entirely
without empirical support. But such a gender-based generalization cannot suffice to justify the
denigration of the efforts of women who do work." (internal citations omitted)).
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alleged interest in adversative education, the Court neither disproved the
interest's empirical predicate'25 nor contested the interest's importance or
relatedness.'26 The interest was disregarded-quite apart from its potential to
satisfy conventional scrutiny-because it was corrupted by gender-based
stereotypes.
A similar weak forbidden interest rule appears in Palmore v. Sidoti,'27 a
child custody case in which a white three-year-old was removed from the
home of her natural mother and black stepfather. The trial court had held that
living in a multiracial household would inevitably expose the young child to
damaging stigmatization; therefore, she would be better off living with her
natural father.' The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, but it did not
deny that racial stigma could jeopardize the child's well-being, nor did it
dispute the State's compelling interest in protecting the child from harm.'29
Instead, the Court flatly barred all government interests grounded in racial
bias from its decisional calculus. 3
Without justifying the weak forbidden interest rules used in Virginia and
Palmore, the function of such doctrines should be clear: Courts use such rules
to excise certain offensive interests that could otherwise push equal protection
in substantively unacceptable directions. If judicial scrutiny could be satisfied
by an interest that embodied stereotypes or by one that rested upon appeasing
racist sentiments, the Equal Protection Clause might be captured by the very
hierarchical biases and asocial backwardness that it strives to combat. If a
white supremacist community made sufficiently credible threats demanding
public school resegregation, for example, the public interest in avoiding
violence and terrorism might pass strict scrutiny and thus permit Brown v.
Board of Education.' itself to be reversed operationally. Because of its deep
conviction that equal protection may not be a hostage to constitutionally
offensive government interests, the Court has barred them from judicial
evaluation altogether.
125. The Court did try to contest these factual claims. See United States v. Virginia, 515 U.S. at
542. ("The notion that admission of women would ... destroy the adversative system ... is a judgment
hardly proved." (citation omitted)); id at 544-45 ("Virginia's fears for the future of VMI may not be
solidly grounded."). The record, however, did not support the majority's conclusions. The trial court
found that women would materially affect VMI's barracks life, thereby altering what the majority
conceded to be the "core experience" of VMI. Id. at 549. See id. at 585-89 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Although Justice Ginsburg did persuasively argue that women could survive the adversative method, she
never showed how the method itself could survive the introduction of women.
126. See id. at 540-45.
127. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
128. See id. at430-31.
129. See id. at 433.
130. See id. at 433-34 ("Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot,
directly or indirectly, give them effect.... The effects of racial prejudice, however real, cannot justify a
racial classification.... (emphasis added)).
131. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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2. Strong Forbidden Interest Rules
Strong forbidden interest rules brand certain government interests as so
unacceptable that their presence would poison other government interests that
might otherwise satisfy judicial scrutiny. To see how such a rule would
operate, consider Derrick Bell's modem fable of "Space Traders," in which
space aliens offer the United States enormous riches and astounding
technology to solve pressing energy and environmental crises. In exchange,
these Traders demand that all African Americans be surrendered to them as
collective property.'32 The government interests in such a case would certainly
qualify as "compelling"; they might reasonably include halting ecological
collapse and global resource wars. Furthermore, the aliens' nonnegotiable
ultimatum would make the racial classification both sufficient and necessary
to achieving these compelling interests. The Supreme Court believed itself to
be facing just this kind of "do-or-die" national emergency during World War
II, when they upheld in Korematsu the internment of Japanese Americans. The
only way that equal protection can effectively prevent such scenarios from
occurring would be to ignore the compelling, narrowly tailored government
interests at stake and to reject the policy's devastating racial impact directly.'33
132. See DERRICK BELL, FACES ATTHEBOTrOM OF THE WELL 158-94 (1992).
133. Although strong forbidden interest rules have powerful intuitive appeal and are supported by
a substantial body of scholarship, their precedential support is astonishingly scant. Any "anti-" theory of
equal protection (anti-caste, anti-parochialism, etc.) rests on the premise that equal protection is defined
best by the interests it forbids. See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, LAW'S PROMISE, LAW'S EXPRESSION, at x
(1993) (advocating a principle of "equal citizenship" that would forbid stigmatizing an individual as a
nonparticipant or a member of an inferior caste); Rubenfeld, supra note 3, at 428-29 ("Equal protection
jurisprudence ... does not purport to measure up and balance the social gains and losses a law will
produce. The constitutional question is instead whether a law embodies an invidious or otherwise
constitutionally impermissible purpose."); cf Bhagwat, supra note 3, at 357 ("[Tlhe Equal Protection
Clause creates certain principles.., that render certain government purposes entirely illegitimate .... ).
The most popular of such theories concerns so-called "impermissible motives." See, e.g., Note,
Impermissible Purposes and the Equal Protection Clause, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 1184 (1986). Under such
a theory, a law arising from or expressing an impermissible will to stigmatize or subordinate a class of
citizens would be inherently unconstitutional.
That said, however, I have found only three lines of actual case law in which forbidden interests
have undermined otherwise satisfactory interests. First, any policy dividing state "citizens into
expanding numbers of permanent classes... would be clearly impermissible." Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55, 64 (1982). Zobel invalidated, under rational review, a plan prorating a state trust's distribution
by recipients' terms of residency, despite Alaska's seemingly legitimate interest in rewarding
nontransient residents for past contributions. See id. at 65. Second, classifications that "burdeni] the
property of nonresidents but not like property of residents are outside the constitutional pale. But this is
not because no rational ground can be conceived ..." Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 533
(1959) (Brennan, J., concurring). Third, in Plyler v. Doe, the fact that a policy created a permanent
subclass of illiterates by excluding illegal aliens from public schools was held to undercut the
government's otherwise legitimate interest in fiscal security:
It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to achieve by ... [creating] a
subclass of illiterates within our boundaries .... [W]hatever savings might be achieved
by denying these children an education, they are wholly insubstantial in light of the costs
involved to these children, the State, and the Nation.
457 U.S. 202, 230 (1981); see also id at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (observing that creating a
"subclass of illiterate persons" makes the challenged policy unconstitutional as well as unwise (citations
omitted)); id at 239 (Powell, J., concurring) ("[T]he interests relied upon by the State would seem to be
insubstantial in view of the consequences to the State itself of wholly uneducated persons living
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3. The Evolving Role of Forbidden Interest Rules
The courts' present skepticism regarding both types of forbidden interest
rules may comport with our judicially conservative intuitions, but it also risks
abandoning our highest constitutional aspirations. For example, critics might
rightly realize that articulating forbidden interest rules would necessarily
require answering constitutional questions that extend beyond the particular
case at bar.'34 However, concerns surrounding "advisory opinions" should not
be overstated. Important questions cannot be ignored simply because they are
difficult, and nothing in equal protection could be more important than
whether to credit government interests based on stereotypes (Virginia),
prejudices (Palmore), or minority oppression for greater social goods ("The
Space Traders" or Korematsu).3 5
No court has ever articulated a list of forbidden interests, and I will not
attempt to do so here. Nonetheless, equal protection almost certainly contains
some substantive content that is not captured within the tripartite framework
and doctrines of suspect class. And to the extent that such values exist,
forbidden interest rules are legitimate, constitutionally viable structures with
which courts can shelter constitutional norms that otherwise might be
doctrinally abandoned.
IV. TECHNICAL SYNTHESIS: WHAT'S WRONG WITH ROMER
Thus far, generality manipulation and exclusionary interest rules have
been explained and considered in isolation from one another, without
addressing their interrelated constitutional consequences. The border points
approach, for example, was advanced as a logical outgrowth of the basic
structure of modem judicial scrutiny, while exclusionary rules were cast as
useful, albeit limited, supplements to the conventional doctrinal framework.
Each of these portrayals is true in a sense, but neither one is complete. Romer
v. Evans'36 will illustrate how control over generality manipulation should
accompany a broader and more principled application of various excluded-
interest rules. Whereas thoughtful combination of border points and excluded-
interest rules could produce a richer, more textured equal protection
jurisprudence than that which currently exists, attention to border points alone
would produce a thinner, weaker one.
indefinitely within its borders."). None of these cases closely match any academic theory of government
interests that should be strongly forbidden.
134. Cf. Zobel, 457 U.S. at 73 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("By choosing ... to declare [a state's]
purpose wholly illegitimate, the Court establishes an uncertain jurisprudence. What makes [a] purpose
illegitimate? Is the purpose illegitimate under all circumstances? What other state interests are wholly
illegitimate?").
135. For a different analysis of judges' flexibility to decide cases narrowly, broadly, deeply, and
shallowly, see Sunstein, supra note 6.
136. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
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On a technical level, the border points approach is an attempt to apply
the accepted framework of scrutiny honestly and to prevent judges from
invalidating policies that they just as easily could have upheld. On a
substantive level, however, the border points theory injects a significant dose
of pro-government interpretive charity into current interest definition practice.
Under a border points approach, invalidating a policy would require finding
each of the policy's supporting interests constitutionally inadequate, even at
its most nearly satisfactory level of generality. This methodology limits
judicial flexibility that is occasionally used arbitrarily and incoherently. But it
also prevents judges from using generality manipulation to shelter
constitutional values that class-based scrutiny alone cannot protect. Romer v.
Evans exemplifies this latter category.
In Romer, the Court defined Colorado's government interest so narrowly
that only "classification... for its own sake" remained, and this interest was
held to be inadequate even for rational basis scrutiny. 137 If the Supreme Court
had applied the border points method, this extraordinarily narrow interest
could not have justified invalidation because many more general interests
existed that should have been evaluated.'38 The Court discovered one interest,
the desire to classify, that was absolutely related to the challenged policy but
that was insufficiently important. In accordance with the border points
approach, the Court should have proceeded to consider more general, more
important, and thus, more constitutionally adequate interests.
137. See id. at 635; see also supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 37.
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CHART 7. IMPORTANCE AND RELATEDNESS AS
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Geno: Interest in harming homosexuals for the sake of doing so.
Gen,: Interest in reducing lawsuits alleging sexual orientation discrimination.
Gen2: Interest in defending basic moral values.
For example, the Court should have considered the government's interest
in reducing the litigation costs of antidiscrimination suits brought by
homosexuals. An interest in reducing legal expenses would almost certainly
have been legitimate for purposes of rational basis review, and the state could
have made two arguments that it would also have been rationally related: First
the state could have asserted that the relative invisibility and mutability of
sexual orientation presented a heightened risk of fraudulent litigation, at least
when compared with other disadvantaged groups. 3 9 Second, the state could
have argued that homosexuals are better politically and economically situated
to defend themselves against discrimination than are other disadvantaged
groups, such that specific causes of action based on homosexuals' sexual
orientation are comparatively unnecessary.
Under the conventional view of equal protection, a proof that this (or any
other) government interest satisfied judicial scrutiny would decide the case.
Part II, however, showed that even a government interest that satisfies judicial
scrutiny may not sustain a challenged policy if the policy violates a mandatory
or forbidden interest rule. Without defending any particular doctrinal result, a
139. Such an argument could have drawn support from Heller i; Doe, 509 U.S. 312. 321-24
(1993), in which the Court justified disparate burdens of proof for involuntary commitment proceedings
by reference to disparate risks of misdiagnosis for defendants with mental illness. For further discussion
of Heller, see supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
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brief investigation of the excluded-interest rules that could have been applied
in Romer is instructive.
The Court could have adopted a mandatory interest rule, holding that
basic legal instruments that "define the powers of political institutions" must
serve an interest in "providing a just framework within which the diverse
political groups in our society may fairly compete."' 40 Such a rule would have
struck down Colorado's Amendment, litigation costs notwithstanding, unless
the State could show that the Amendment somehow improved the justice or
diversity of the its political system.' A mandatory interest rule of this type
would presume state constitutions to be impartial and would prevent
government agents from warping this basic political fabric for ordinary public
ends such as reducing litigation costs.
An aggressive application of this mandatory interest rule would expose
all provisions of state constitutions to equal protection challenge unless they
served an interest in providing "a just framework for achieving political
diversity." A more moderate interpretation could have emerged, however,
under which only changes to state constitutions would be subject to challenge,
but the undergirding status quo would not. In the same way that geographic
districting is presumed to be impartial in electoral apportionments 42 and jury
selection is presumed to be impartial in judicial procedure, 43 state
constitutions could be assumed to be impartial or to be impartial within a
certain constitutional range. Thus, a new mandatory interest rule of this sort
would not necessarily have implied a radical shift in state governments'
current practices.
Alternately, the Court could have proposed a weak forbidden interest rule
similar to that advanced in Virginia.'" VMI's argument concerning
"adversative training" was found to have been stained by stereotypes of
women as weak, timid, and otherwise incapable. 45 In Romer, the Supreme
Court could have excluded an interest in curbing legal costs as linked with
several stereotypes about homosexuals. First, the Court could have held that
the asserted inability to recognize discrimination against gays reliably
embodied a stereotype that sexual orientation is a mutable lifestyle choice that
can be easily feigned or adopted. Second, the presumed hiddenness of
homosexuality could have been viewed as resonating with stereotypes of gays
as being, by default, "in the closet." Third, the claims of gays' prominent
140. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 393 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring); cf Evans v. Romer,
854 P.2d 1270, 1279-81 (Colo. 1993) (using the arguments behind Hunter's mandatory interest rule to
justify using strict scrutiny), rev'd, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Justice Scalia's dissent derisively refers to this
line of argument as a theory of "electoral-procedural discrimination" that "finds no support in law or
logic." Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
141. For a disturbing argument that the Amendment could have served a government interest in
preempting efforts by antidemocratic "gay activists" to radically reform Colorado's political
environment, see Nagel, supra note 3 1, at 180-89.
142. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 121-126.
145. See United States v. Virginia, 515 U.S. 518, 541-42 (1996).
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socioeconomic status could have been linked with a stereotyped view of
recognizing only those homosexuals who have the financial means to face
social repercussions of openly acknowledging their sexuality. To establish a
weak forbidden interest rule against anti-gay stereotypes, the Court could have
provided a history of the distrust and hatred that homosexuals have endured 146
similar to Virginia's historical examples of women's subordination.' 47
The Court also could have proclaimed a strong forbidden interest rule
that would have invalidated the Colorado initiative, regardless of other
government interests that the Amendment might have served. The six-Justice
majority in Romer occasionally seemed on the verge of adopting such a rule,
but the precise interest to be forbidden remained only partially articulated.
Was the offending interest imposition of a "broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group?"' 48 Was it erecting greater difficulties for
"one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from [its]
government?"' 49 Was it that the State made homosexual citizens "stranger[s]
to [their own state's] laws?"'50 Any one of these government interests could
have been held so offensive as to invalidate Colorado's Amendment, but the
Court would have had to explain why such interests were so invidious as to
fatally poison all others.
This Note does not advocate any of these doctrinal positions; the present
goal is to outline some of the legal possibilities that mandatory and forbidden
interest rules create. Judicial decisions that rest on generality manipulation not
only obscure the meaning of terms like "rational review" and "legitimate
interest,"'' they also obscure important principles regarding what constitutes
a substantive constitutional wrong. By hiding mandatory and forbidden
interest rules under willful generality manipulation, the Romer Court
successfully brokered six votes for a bold constitutional holding,'52 but it also
took a significant step away from achieving a stable, rational jurisprudence of
equal protection.
V. CONCLUSION
In a world of second-best solutions, it is too easy to remedy one
doctrinal problem by inadvertently creating another. The Supreme Court
constructed the three-tiered framework of judicial scrutiny as a reaction
against the Internment Cases, attempting to protect racial minorities from
government discrimination as it never had before. Whether or not this
146. See, e.g., Koppelman, supra note 31, at 114, 123-29 (providing a small evidentiary sample
of the discrimination against and hatred toward homosexuals).
147. See United States v. Virginia, 515 U.S. at 542-45.
148. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
149. Id at 633.
150. Id at 635.
151. See supra Subsection II.C.3.
152. See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 20-21 (noting that the Romer Court prioritized attaining
consensus over articulating legal theory).
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framework succeeded in its original mission,"' tiered scrutiny is now being
pressed to serve every norm embodied in "equal protection of the laws," and it
is plainly not up to the task.
This Note does not propose a new theory of equal protection; rather, it
analyzes techniques by which existing theories can be implemented openly
and effectively. Conventional wisdom has accepted tiered scrutiny as a
comprehensive expression of equal protection doctrine, creating enormous
pressure for litigants and scholars to link perceived constitutional wrongs to
some form of heightened scrutiny. The current problem, however, is that the
doctrines of tiered scrutiny have rigidified around the concept of suspect
classification.'54 Whereas it was once thought possible that poverty would be a
quasi-suspect class or public housing a fundamental right, today's more
cautious Court has firmly limited heightened scrutiny to well-established
classes and circumstances.'55
The current judicial response to this rigidity has been generality
manipulation. By defining government interests broadly or narrowly, courts
can reach the results that they prefer without explaining such preferences'
legal basis. Judges' ad hoc tinkering has robbed equal protection of
transparency and predictability, but it also has concealed conscious and
unconscious efforts to remedy class-based scrutiny's normative shortfalls. By
limiting judicial discretion over generality determination, the border points
theory attempts not only to reduce arbitrariness and clarify existing
constitutional doctrines but also to expose other constitutional norms
operating below the doctrinal surface.
Excluded-interest rules are the important next piece of the constitutional
puzzle, designed to protect values and ideals that conventional scrutiny would
153. Cf Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1111 (1997) (arguing that equal protection doctrines requiring
discriminatory purpose allow the state-sanctioned persistence of powerful racial and gender hierarchies).
154. The late Justice Marshall's protests against this crystallization have largely passed unheeded:
The Court apparently seeks to establish ... that equal protection cases fall into one of two
neat categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review--strict scrutiny or mere
rationality. But... principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that it has
applied a spectrum of standards .... This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the
degree of care with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I
believe, on the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected
and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular classification is
drawn.
San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973). Compare id., with sources cited supra
note 1. For discussion of the Court's simultaneous curtailment of the fundamental rights branch of equal
protection, see sources cited supra note 2.
155. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (declining to extend intermediate scrutiny to
gays); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (declining to extend intermediate scrutiny
to mentally retarded plaintiffs); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)
(declining to extend intermediate scrutiny to age discrimination); San Antonio Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 1
(holding that primary and secondary education is not a fundamental right); United States v. Kras, 409
U.S. 434 (1973) (holding that entering into bankruptcy does not implicate any fundamental right); James
v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (declining to extend intermediate scrutiny to the poor); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (holding that citizens' basic economic needs do not implicate any
fundamental right).
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otherwise leave exposed. Mandatory interests, for example, are well-suited to
free vital political institutions from political interest and partiality. Weak
forbidden interest rules can reduce the corrupting influence of persistent
biases by barring them from constitutional scrutiny. And strong forbidden
interest rules are reserved to bar unconditionally particular outcomes seen as
too horrible to permit under any circumstances.
By applying the border points theory and excluded-interest rules in
conjunction with one another, judges can produce jurisprudential consistency
and transparency without sacrificing norms of equality and fairness that equal
protection should properly encompass. Although the contours and limits of
these norms and of these techniques remain open for debate, such debate itself
may carry equal protection into a phase of doctrinal development that reaches
well beyond the confines of classification.
